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UNREASONABLE ADJUSTMENTS: MEDICAL EDUCATION, MENTAL
DISORDER, DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION AND PUBLIC SAFETY
Recently the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales found that
the University of Newcastle had discriminated against a medical student with
borderline personality disorder and bipolar disorder on the grounds of her
disability. This column summarises the case, and integrates a psychodynamic
account of borderline personality disorder with Fulford’s conceptual analysis of
mental disorder as action failure, that is no different in principle from physical
illnesses, some instances of which appear to uncontroversially rule out of
contention some applicants for medical training. It is argued that some
applicants for medical and health care programs with mental disorders should
not be selected, because their disabilities are not amenable to satisfactory
accommodation in the university training period, and they are incompatible
with clinical training and practice. Universities should develop “Inherent
Requirement” policies that better integrate their responsibility to support
disabled students with the responsibility, currently reserved entirely to
regulators, to ensure safe practice by their graduates.
INTRODUCTION
Medical and other health professional educators and the institutions that employ them are charged
with providing education and training that will ensure that their graduates are “work-ready” and safe
practitioners, at least in the context of the supervised environments they initially enter for the next
phase of their training. This duty is primarily focused on helping students develop the knowledge,
skills and attitudes that are deemed appropriate for medical and health care practice.1 In most cases,
the educational work serves the postgraduate purpose, and the duty of the universities to their students
to provide them with an appropriate professional education, aligns with the duty to the community to
graduate only safe, effective and compassionate practitioners.
However, this alignment may sometimes be threatened. This article describes a recent case and
raises issues in response that focus on a tension between the duty of universities to their students as
university students, and their duty to protect the community by ensuring students are appropriate
trainees for the health professions. Individual medical and other health professional educators,
particularly in the current climate of uncapped university cohorts and the imperative to educate
sufficient numbers of practitioners for workforce needs, are perturbed by the requirement that
universities not discriminate against their students, even when there exists a strong consensus amongst
educators that certain students should not be permitted to graduate and to practise, and that it would
have been better, for the community and for the students, had they not been admitted in the first place.
The case of BKY v The University of Newcastle (BKY)2 is an example of the kind of case where
this tension arises. BKY is an Australian medical student who suffers from borderline personality
disorder (BPD), and who was found to have been discriminated against by her university which denied
her the opportunity to extend the time required to complete her training program. This article
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summarises the decision, provides an overview of the primary condition affecting the student, and
raises issues for consideration in the context of the requirements of medical practice. The discussion is
necessarily tentative and suggestive, rather than declarative and conclusive. There are numerous
unknown factors in relation to most physical and psychological maladies, and prediction is fraught.
Nevertheless, this case and others involving psychological, emotional, cognitive and interpersonal
disabilities point to a conversation that should occur to better balance the interests of individuals who
aspire to professional health practice and the safety of the public whom they would serve.
BKY V THE UNIVERSITY OF NEWCASTLE
In BKY in the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the University was found to have
discriminated against BKY based on her disability, in denying BKY an extension to complete the
medical course. BKY is a registered nurse who had commenced the five-year medical course in 2004.
Under university rules, the time allowed for completion of the course was eight years. BKY applied
for an 18-month extension, but this was denied in January 2012.3
BKY had bipolar disorder (type II), BPD and severe psychosocial stressors related to the course
and its requirements.4 She had attended a psychiatrist regularly throughout her earlier nursing degree,
subsequently while employed as a nurse, and during her medical degree. She self-reported her
conditions to the New South Wales Medical Board in 2008. During the medical program she worked
as a nurse part-time in the John Hunter Hospital’s Intensive Care Unit.5
In his evidence, the Dean of Medicine Professor Ian Symonds indicated that over eight years,
BKY had progressed to the three-and-a-half year mark of the degree. She had passed 13 courses,
repeated eight of these courses, failed four courses and been awarded withdrawal without penalty for
five courses. She had not been required to “show cause” why her enrolment should be cancelled on the
basis of unsatisfactory academic performance at any time during the course.6
Professor Symonds considered that:
• there was a poor prospect of BKY completing the degree within the requested extension period of
18 months;
• further study would be detrimental to her health;
• BKY had had a downward academic trend over the previous three years, and there was an issue as
to the currency of BKY’s knowledge in the “interests of academic integrity and professional
standards”;
• there was a particular concern about BKY’s anxiety in relation to performance in clinical
rotations; and
• there was a risk of unsafe practice even if BKY completed the degree.7
BKY’s psychiatrist Dr O’Brien gave evidence to the effect that:
• BKY’s disorders were characterised by anxiety, especially performance anxiety approaching
examinations with consequent avoidance behaviour, although she was able to complete avoided
exams later;
• BKY had a poor sense of self-worth compensated for by academic achievement;
• the intensity of BKY’s fear of failure was sometimes so great that she would have a paralysis of
ability to study;
• like others, BKY tended to take any way out of anxiety which was an avoidance of responsibility;
• she had advised the Dean that BKY had had a similar crisis during her nursing degree, but when
faced with the prospect of not being able to finish, she completed the degree and worked
competently thereafter;
3 BKY v The University of Newcastle [2014] NSWCATAD 39 at [1].
4 BKY v The University of Newcastle [2014] NSWCATAD 39 at [14].
5 BKY v The University of Newcastle [2014] NSWCATAD 39 at [15]-[21].
6 BKY v The University of Newcastle [2014] NSWCATAD 39 at [29].
7 BKY v The University of Newcastle [2014] NSWCATAD 39 at [28].
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• BKY was capable of functioning under deadline pressure when required; and
• BKY’s symptoms were unlikely to emerge and disrupt effective functioning as a medical
practitioner.8
Under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW), it is unlawful to directly or indirectly
discriminate against anyone on the basis of disability, where these terms refer to less favourable
treatment than treatment of someone not disabled in the same circumstances, or requiring a disabled
person to comply with the requirement that non-disabled people would be able to comply with.9 It is
unlawful for an educational authority to discriminate on grounds of disability.10
The tribunal found that:
The evidence supports a finding that the psychiatric conditions affected the applicant’s thought
processes, emotions or judgment and has resulted in disturbed behaviour. This falls within the scope of
the sections 4(1)(e) and 49A(e) of the Act and therefore constitutes a disability within the meaning of
the Act.11
Two issues then needed to be proven: (1) whether BKY had been treated less favourably than
someone without the disability in the same or materially similar circumstances (the comparison issue);
and (2) whether such less favourable treatment occurred on the ground of the disability (the causation
issue).
The tribunal found that the comparison issue was made out on the basis that both BKY and
another student (whose case details were submitted by BKY and who the tribunal determined did not
have a disability) both sought an extension on the basis of poor academic performance, and the
non-disabled student was granted the extension in circumstances of that similar record.12
Regarding causation, the tribunal inferred a probable connection between the decision not to grant
BKY an extension and her psychiatric condition, on the basis of:
• the Dean’s concern re BKY’s currency of knowledge that should also have been applied to the
other student;
• the Dean’s adverting to extenuating circumstances in the case of the other student – poor study
habits, poor sleep, and living away from home – but not considering BKY’s psychiatric condition
as extenuating circumstances in her case;
• the weight placed by the Dean on his opinion that BKY would not be able to complete the course
in the time requested, compared with the other student who was improving, in contrast to
Dr O’Brien’s view that she could do so, given her history of responding well to limits, with the
psychiatrist’s opinion being favoured over the Dean’s on the basis that she was a psychiatrist and
he was not;
• the weight given by the Dean to his opinion concerning the effect on BKY’s health of her
continuing study; and
• the weight given by the Dean to his opinion concerning BKY’s suitability to practise safely, based
on her psychiatric condition.13
The tribunal in this case explicitly stated that it was not its task to determine if BKY would be fit
to practise, following her completion of the degree. It noted that completion would not mean that she
could automatically practise, that her psychiatric conditions were registered with the New South Wales
Medical Council, and that it is the Council’s responsibility to determine if BKY is fit to practise.14
8 BKY v The University of Newcastle [2014] NSWCATAD 39 at [30]-[42].
9 Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW), s 49B(1)(a), (b).
10 Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW), s 49L(2).
11 BKY v The University of Newcastle [2014] NSWCATAD 39 at [72].
12 BKY v The University of Newcastle [2014] NSWCATAD 39 at [93].
13 BKY v The University of Newcastle [2014] NSWCATAD 39 at [99]-[112].
14 BKY v The University of Newcastle [2014] NSWCATAD 39 at [113].
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BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER
BKY was agreed to suffer from bipolar disorder (type II), BPD and severe psychosocial stressors
related to the medical course and its requirements. Bipolar disorder (type II) is a serious mental
condition that may, at times, disrupt a doctor’s or other health professional’s ability to adequately and
safely discharge their duties. Nevertheless, given appropriate insight on the part of the practitioner
concerning early warning symptoms of exacerbations, such as depression or hypomania,15 timely
withdrawal from practice during exacerbations, appropriate treatment during both exacerbation and
intervening phases, and in some cases, oversight by the relevant health practitioner board, there is
general agreement that health professionals with such a disorder can function effectively. There is a
significant number of registered doctors and medical students who suffer from bipolar disorder of
either type I or II.
The meaning and implications of “severe psychosocial stressors related to the medical course and
its requirements” is not made clear in the tribunal’s judgment. However, it would be safe to conclude
that anyone who had bipolar disorder (either type I or type II) and BPD would experience
considerable stress in the context of a demanding tertiary education program, and the facts of the case
bear this out. Nevertheless, many medical and other health professional students endure stresses of
different kinds, and successfully negotiate the program to graduate and practise effectively and safely.
The existence of bipolar disorder and severe psychosocial stressors in a medical student should
not, of themselves, or even in combination, prevent the student from completing a medical program
and subsequently practising safely and effectively. However, BPD, as illustrated by some of the
features exemplified by BKY and also more generally considered, presents a more problematic set of
issues in relation to admission to medical and other programs, completion of the program, and
subsequent practice. This section describes current understandings of this disorder and its prognosis.
In the discussion section of the article, this understanding and aspects of the case of BKY will be
utilised to explore issues concerning inherent requirements to commence and complete a medical
program, in the context of the nature, demands and requirements of medical practice, a model of
mental disorders as a subtype of the broad but single category of illness, incipient developments by
Australian medical programs to impose “inherent requirements” on prospective medical students,
current discrimination law, and the obligations of universities to the community.
Conceptualising the personality disorders
The personality disorders constitute a contested conceptual and clinical category of what is overall a
historically contested, conceptually fraught and sometimes (though less so as time passes) clinically
derided area of medical practice – psychiatry. It will not be profitable, nor would it be possible, to
rehearse here the many debates about the nature of psychiatry, its scientific credentials and evidence
base or lack thereof, its putative primarily evaluative status in contrast to the factual nature of
“organic” medicine and so on. Suffice to say that these debates are clearly pertinent to the
characterisation of certain dispositions, temperaments and behavioural patterns as disorders of
personality. Nevertheless, there are certain dispositions, temperaments and behavioural patterns that
have been labelled as personality disorders, which are associated with considerable psychological
distress, self-harm, suicide, social and interpersonal dysfunction, harm to others, and vocational
disruption. What follows is a current characterisation of personality disorders and BPD as generally
understood in the professional psychological/psychiatric community. Of course there are differences of
perspective, different views concerning aetiology, different treatment approaches and so on. But there
is also an emerging, core psychodynamic understanding of what BPD is, what contributes to its
development, what it means and represents, and what it implies for the future.
15 Hypomania is a less severe form of mania, which is more characteristic of bipolar disorder (type I) and which may include
psychotic features.
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It is helpful first to consider the personality and its organisation, from healthy to disordered states,
and the varying severity of the disordered states. We can characterise the personality as and from the
evident fact that there are ways of thinking, feeling, behaving and relating to others that, while highly
variable across different people, show great stability over time in most individual people. These ways
of thinking and so on may be conscious, but are often spontaneous and inferred as unconscious. In
either case they are different ways of adapting to the changes in our environment that are constantly
occurring. These include threats and losses that can produce anxiety, grief, loss of self-esteem, acting
out and other cognitive, emotional and behavioural responses including a number of psychological
defensive processes. To the extent that these responses produce significant problems to the person
himself and/or disruption or harm to others, we may see them as being disorders of personality.16
While boundaries are inevitably difficult to draw precisely, the difference between a healthy and a
disturbed personality lies in contrast across a number of dimensions: differences between flexible
responses in thinking and feeling to external or internal stresses, and rigid responses and greater
difficulty in coping; the contrast between a clear and a deficient sense of one’s own identity; the
contrast between satisfying and dysfunctional relationships with others; the difference between the
ability to manage stress without unduly imposing it on others and the lack of this capacity; and the
contrast between the ability to regulate one’s emotions and behaviour and a significant diminution or
the absence of that ability.17 In psychodynamic terminology, psychologically healthy people have
achieved during their formative years a number of intrapersonal and interpersonal capacities: a stable
self-identity and stable object relations (relationship with others); the tolerance of affective states in
oneself and in others; affect regulation in response to changes; super-ego integration (a mature moral
sensibility); adequate reality testing; and adequate ego strength and resilience.18 The different
disorders of personality are characterised by different patterns of deficiencies in these capacities.
During the 20th century the broad division between, and the restriction of psychological disorders
to, the neurotic and psychotic conditions, was broken down further in response to the accumulating
observations of a further broad category of patients who were not overtly psychotic but who displayed
less realistic transference responses19 to the therapist than most neurotic patients, who retain many of
the capacities noted above. While not being overtly psychotic, these patients are generally more
disturbed than those with neuroses.20 Some observers have characterised this broad, “intermediate”
category as displaying borderline personality organisation; this should be distinguished from the
narrower BPD as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)21 as
one of many different personality disorders.22 This distinction, however, is by no means hard and fast,
since there are important overlaps and blurring of boundaries between the various personality
disorders in the DSM. The broader concept of borderline personality organisation can be thought of in
terms of a category lying on a continuum that includes healthy, neurotic, borderline and psychotic
16 PDM Taskforce, Psychodynamic Diagnostic Manual (Alliance of Psychoanalytic Organisations, 2006) pp 17-18.
17 PDM Taskforce, n 16, p 18.
18 PDM Taskforce, n 16, pp 22-23.
19 Transference is a psychodynamic concept referring to the psychological process whereby the patient unconsciously attributes
qualities of someone in the patient’s past to the therapist, and at the same time experiences feelings that were associated with that
person in the current relationship with the therapist. See Gabbard G, Psychodynamic Psychiatry in Clinical Practice (4th ed,
American Psychiatric Publishing, 2005) pp 18-20.
20 Gabbard, n 19, p 428; PDM Taskforce, n 16, pp 20-21.
21 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) is the publication of the American Psychiatric Association
that provides the categorisation of the mental disorders that is widely used in psychiatric practice and research. The most recent
version, DSM-5, was published in 2013. See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (5th ed, May 2013).
22 The personality disorders are listed in the DSM under the broad category of Axis II disorders, which also includes
developmental disorders. For practical purposes, all other mental disorders are listed under Axis I.
Bioethical issues
(2014) 22 JLM 31 35
personalities,23 while it is also sometimes used to capture under one heading a number of the different
DSM categories that fall under the “Cluster B” group of personality disorders, including borderline,
narcissistic, histrionic and anti-social disorders.24
The links, overlaps and blurring of boundaries between the broader notion of borderline
personality organisation and the narrower concept of BPD is well illustrated through the work of
Kernberg in the 1960s and 1970s. Kernberg described a borderline personality organisation as
comprising:
• ego weakness expressed as the inability to sublimate drives, delay the discharge of impulses and
to modulate anxiety;
• a tendency to regress to quasi-psychotic thinking when under the pressure of strong emotional
influences;
• defensive psychological processes including splitting (for example, the alternating expression of
contradictory behaviours together with the ability to be apparently oblivious or to deny this);
compartmentalisation of others as “all-good” or “all-bad”; projective identification, where
representations of the self are split off and projected on to others, sometimes in order to control
them; and
• pathological internalisation of relationship with others so that the internal world and experiences
of others cannot be appreciated.25
While these characteristics also form part of the core of BPD, more narrowly construed, they also
feature to greater or lesser extents according to both DSM category and individual patient, in the other
DSM Cluster B diagnostic categories.26 The continuum of “personality disorderdness” is reflected in
the fact that some patients are diagnosed with more than one discrete DSM personality disorder.27
Clinical features, diagnosis, aetiology of BPD
DSM-5 characterises BPD as “a pervasive pattern of instability of interpersonal relationships,
self-image, and affects, and marked impulsivity that begins by early adulthood and is present in a
variety of contexts”. It provides diagnostic criteria as follows, and stipulates that at least five criteria
should be satisfied to make the diagnosis. Readers should note the congruence between these clinical
features and Kernberg’s broad features of borderline personality organisation.
1. Frantic efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment (not including behaviour covered in
criterion 5);
2. A pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal relationships characterised by alternating between
extremes of idealisation and devaluation;
3. Identity disturbance: markedly and persistently unstable self-image or sense of self;
4. Impulsivity in at least two areas that are potentially self-damaging (for example, spending, sex,
substance abuse, reckless driving, binge eating) (not including behaviour covered in criterion 5);
5. Recurrent suicidal behavior, gestures, or threats, or self-mutilating behaviour;
6. Affective instability due to a marked reactivity of mood (for example, intense episodic dysphoria,
irritability, or anxiety usually lasting a few hours and only rarely more than a few days);
7. Chronic feelings of emptiness;
8. Inappropriate, intense anger or difficulty controlling anger (for example, frequent displays of
temper, constant anger, recurrent physical fights);
23 PDM Taskforce, n 16, pp 20-21.
24 Gabbard, n 19, p 427. Cluster A disorders include paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders, and Cluster C
disorders include avoidant, dependent and obsessive-compulsive personality disorders.
25 Kernberg OF, “Borderline Personality Organization” (1967) 15 J Am Psychoanal Assoc 641; Kernberg OF, Borderline
Conditions and Pathological Narcissism (Jason Aronson, New York, 1975).
26 Gabbard, n 19, p 431; PDM Taskforce, n 16, p 29.
27 Allen JG, Restoring Mentalizing in Attachment Relationships: Treating Trauma With Plain Old Therapy (American
Psychiatric Publishing, Washington DC, 2013) p 119.
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9. Transient, stress-related paranoid ideation or severe dissociative symptoms.28
The fact that not all criteria are required reflects the fact that, while there can be a perception that
people with BPD are impulsively extroverted or flamboyantly perverse in their behaviour, some
people diagnosed with BPD do not behave as destructively, but nonetheless suffer from chronic
despair and problems with affect regulation, identity stability, relationships with others, resilience and
moral consistency.29 Whether a person with BPD tends to be more extroverted or more introverted in
manifesting their particular combination of clinical features listed as DSM diagnostic criteria, the
nature of these features and their congruence with Kernberg’s account of borderline personality
organisation strongly suggest that they represent, sometimes even in opposite forms within the same
individual, deep-seated and largely unconscious themes and conflicts.30
These difficulties can be seen as impairments of self-functioning and interpersonal functioning,
with these two areas demonstrating a group of psychological processes that take us somewhat further
towards appreciating the complexity and severity of BPD. These processes are agreed by experts to be
essentially primitive or immature defence mechanisms that are generally more distorting of the
person’s inner reality and ability to function as an individual and in relation to others than those
encountered in the neuroses.31 They interfere with what we take to be the normal boundaries of the
self, with the stability of the person’s self-identity and with accurate self-appraisal. They undermine
the pursuit of goals and the ability to reflect on those goals and standards of behaviour involved in
achieving them that we associate with normal individual and social behaviour. They distort and at
times extinguish empathy, removing the appreciation of others’ perspectives and the effect of one’s
behaviour on others.32
Two central defence mechanisms are splitting and projective identification, both of which were
identified and described by Kernberg. Projective identification is generally agreed to be a process
whereby a patient unconsciously “splits off” particular self-representations and projects these on to
others (that is, attributes often troubling and/or undesirable aspects of themselves to someone with
whom they have a relationship, including the therapist). The other person is genuinely considered to
have these particular attributes and is treated accordingly. Other processes include denial and the
ability to apparently blandly disregard quite disturbing things; exerting control over others (sometimes
via projective identification) and often not seeing them as separate individuals; and introjection, or
taking in others’ characteristics as one’s own; primitive idealisation (seeing another person as all
good) or devaluation (seeing another as all bad). These processes are often powerful enough to evoke
strong responses in therapists,33 either of anger, resentment and hatred, or of extreme sympathy to the
extent that some therapists cross professional boundaries in efforts to rescue or save the patient from
their continuing experience.34
28 American Psychiatric Association, n 21, “Borderline Personality Disorder”, http://dsm.psychiatryonline.org/
content.aspx?bookid=556&sectionid=41101784.
29 PDM Taskforce, n 16, pp 24-25.
30 PDM Taskforce, n 16, p 31.
31 PDM Taskforce, n 16, pp 25-26.
32 Allen, n 27, p 119.
33 PDM Taskforce, n 16, p 25.
34 All the psychological processes/defence mechanisms mentioned here should strike at least vague, but in some cases crisply
peeling bells, in readers. Those with knowledge of these things sometimes refer to certain of their friends (and enemies) as
“high-functioning borderlines”. By this stage of the column, and certainly by the end, readers may consider this to be something
of a contradiction, given the apparent gravity of the problems that people with BPD must cope with. We need to remember that,
as stated previously, to the extent that these psychological defensive processes produce significant problems to the person
himself and/or others, we may see them as disorders of personality. But defensive processes in themselves are normal, and our
physical and social survival depend on their exercise. As with much in psychiatry and also in organic medicine, pathology is a
matter of the exaggeration of normal phenomena. Just as an over-reactive immune system can make of a normal and necessary
physiological function a pathological state, such as an allergic condition, so too can exaggerated psychological defence
mechanisms help to constitute psychopathology. The “high-functioning” borderline person may well resent that description, but
the person will fall somewhere along the continuum described above, from healthy, to neurotic, to borderline, to psychotic
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Accounting for the phenomena of psychopathological states depends on a wide range of inquiries,
theories, evidence and tests. Some disorders are more soundly based in knowledge concerning the
physical structure and functioning of the brain and interruptions to these than others. The personality
disorders are less well understood in biochemical and physiological terms than depression, for
example, although this is not to say that depression is well understood. Following their recognition as
a somewhat different kind of disorder from neuroses and psychoses, these disorders were initially
explained according to psychoanalytic and psychodynamic theories and concepts. These concepts are
now gradually receiving endorsement as brain imaging, other physical investigations and empirical
research shed new and different light on what happens in different disorders, but psychodynamic
approaches, broadly construed, remain the mainstay of treatment. This is not surprising, given the
current understanding of the aetiology of BPD in particular, in the context of its symptoms and the
apparent defensive processes that occur. There is now a reasonably coherent consensus on the links
between aetiology, symptomatology and treatment. The following account utilises the most recent,
distinguishable approach to these, viz the mentalising model of BPD, but it should be understood that,
rather than a radically new departure, this model is a development of earlier psychodynamic theory
concerning BPD, and incorporates much of that theory.
Traumatised children are four times as likely as those without such a history to develop
personality disorders.35 This refers not just to BPD, but BPD has been the most systematically linked
disorder to attachment trauma in infancy and childhood and the consequent impaired mentalising that
is the core of the mentalising model.36 Gabbard has noted that earlier psychoanalytic formulations for
BPD posited childhood neglect, loss and/or abandonment as the core aetiological factors, but that later
empirical studies point to childhood abuse as a major contributing factor, with sexual abuse present in
60% of cases and parent-child incest in 25%.37 Of course, these figures also mean that abuse is not
necessary for the development of BPD, nor is it sufficient.38 But again there is a strong professional
consensus that sexual abuse is often related to a broader pattern of family discord and disturbance.
More recent prospective studies have demonstrated that inadequate affection and nurturing, and
aversive parental behaviour such as harsh punishments are associated with later development of
BPD.39
Abuse, neglect and trauma are believed to result in problematic attachment patterns.40 This
statement is almost tautological for those with any familiarity with psychopathology, but indeed also
for a large proportion of the population, as a result of the permeation and adoption into mainstream
culture over almost a century of Freudian and post-Freudian psychoanalytic and psychodynamic ideas.
Secure child-mother and child-parent attachment is seen as a crucial requirement for developing those
capacities mentioned above, including stable self-identity and object relations, affect regulation and
tolerance of affective states, super-ego integration, reality testing and resilience, and whose lack at
least partially underpins many cases of all the personality disorders.
The mentalising model’s key initial concept is that of the crucial necessity for the presence of
adequate, secure attachment of the infant to (in most cases) the mother, for the development of the
ability to mentalise (that is, the ability to represent one’s experience including interpersonal
personalities, as do we all. The boundaries and the descriptors are fuzzy, as are the therapeutic consequences. Many people,
whose psychological defence mechanisms are not as exaggerated as those of a person with severe BPD, nevertheless have
problems and cause problems to others, and, in principle, would benefit from some form of psychotherapy.
35 Johnson JG, Cohen P, Brown J, Smailes EM and Bernstein DP, “Childhood Maltreatment Increases Risk for Personality
Disorders During Early Adulthood” (1999) 56 Arch Gen Psychiatry 600.
36 Allen, n 27, p 120.
37 Gabbard, n 19, pp 435-436. Note that these figures, as always, depend on the inclusion/exclusion criteria for the studies that
produce them. This said, this finding is now well accepted.
38 Allen, n 27, pp 120-122.
39 Johnson JG, Cohen P, Chen H, Kasen S and Brook JS, “Parenting Behaviours Associated with Risk for Offspring Personality
Disorder During Adulthood” (2006) 63 Arch Gen Psychiatry 579.
40 Bateman A and Fonagy P, Mentalization-Based Treatment for Borderline Personality Disorder (Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 2006) p 11; Gabbard, n 19, p 437; Allen, n 27, p 118.
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experience in mental state terms)41 to recognise that one’s mental states and those of others are fallible
and subjective, and to develop the capacity to infer others’ mental states from their behaviour, facial
expressions and so on.42
Early disorganisation of secure attachment disrupts these abilities and consequently disrupts the
development of the normal structure of the self.43 Having one’s own mental states recognised and
understood in a caring, nurturing environment is necessary for both the development of the ability to
recognise and understand those of others, and to develop a sense of coherence of one’s
self-experience. This coherence and ability are disrupted by traumatic experience, which induces a
regression to more primitive and concrete modes of experiencing and thinking about things and the
person or people who are the causes of the abuse. Because an infant’s needs for attachment and
coherence do not disappear, under circumstances of psychological and/or physical trauma, different
strategies to maintain these appear.44 These may include:
• paradoxical identification with the aggressor (in order to maintain attachment and some level of
control) and consequent internalisation of the intentions of the aggressor as part of a new and
alien “self”, but experienced as self-hatred;
• projective identification of this alien, unbearable self on to others to avoid self-harm or
self-destruction as a result of self-hatred;
• regression to concrete modes of thinking whereby experience can no longer be contextualised in
reality, with perception and conceptualisation in primarily physical terms and not in terms of
mental states (that is, disappearance of the developing capacity for mentalisation);
• an associated lack of the capacities of imagination and mental playfulness, and the capacity to
question one’s own thinking, leading to an inability to appreciate that one’s perceptions do not
always reflect reality;
• restoration of coherence by controlling and manipulative behaviour of others;
• projective identification of the internalised, alien aspects of the self on to others, resulting in
seeking attachments within repeated, dependent and abusive relationships, and not being able to
leave such relationships on pain of abandonment (which would be a repetition of the original
insult/trauma/neglect);
• self-harming actions as the only perceived means of bringing about caring from others, but also as
a result of the concreteness and intractability of the perception of oneself as bad, and of physical
action being the only way of changing this; self-harm is often triggered by perceptions of
imminent loss (for example, of a partner) and may temporarily restore a sense of internal
coherence;
• suicide as a response to perceived imminent loss of self-coherence;
• acts of violence towards others, especially if others fail or are perceived to fail to be the required
receptacles and vehicles of the person’s projected, intolerable experiences, and so induce feelings
of humiliation in the borderline person; in the absence of developed mentalising, the destruction
of the other is, concretely, the destruction of the alien part of the self.45
Again, readers will note the overlaps between these conceptualisations and those of Kernberg.
More importantly, these strategies do not reflect a model or theory that is not based on close
observation of the experiences and behaviour of people diagnosed with BPD. They help constitute a
model that provides a coherent understanding of how and why these observed behaviours arise.
Further, while some of these strategies are depicted as responses to overt trauma, it is not only discrete
traumatic events that undermine the development of normal mentalising. It is likely that this results
from a more general and pervasive pattern of upbringing characterised by lack of consideration of the
41 Bateman and Fonagy, n 40.
42 Gabbard, n 19, pp 436-437.
43 Bateman and Fonagy, n 40.
44 The strategies described here deliberately integrate the processes that the mentalisation model proposes occur in infancy with
some of the observations made of behaviours at later stages.
45 Bateman and Fonagy, n 40, pp 12-14, 16-17, 19-21, 24, 26-28; Gabbard, n 19, p 437.
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child’s perspective, general neglect or outright rejection, excessively harsh control, and incoherent and
inconsistent communication, as noted above,46 and that traumatic events, including the sexual and
other abuse that is strongly associated with BPD, occur within this broader environment.
Treatment and prognosis
BPD has been described by some as virtually untreatable. Treating BPD and the other disorders of
personality is certainly difficult, emotionally taxing and lengthy. In recent years, different treatments
have been developed and therapeutic pessimism has yielded to a more optimistic, yet guarded
outlook.47 A 2003 meta-analysis of eight treatment trials showed that psychodynamic treatment and
cognitive behaviour therapy were both effective in BPD, although there were limitations to this
analysis, including the fact that outcome measures in most of the studies referred to Axis I conditions
such as depression being associated with the diagnoses of BPD in most patients.48 However, if this
association is often present, measurements of outcome that ignore Axis I pathology will not provide an
accurate picture of overall treatment results.49
The three prominent modes of current treatment are dialectical behaviour therapy (DBT),
transference focused psychotherapy (TFP) and mentalisation-based treatment (MBT).50 In all three
approaches, the dynamics of the patient-therapist relationship are fundamental, and in any approach to
treating patients with BPD, the balance between empathic validation of the patient’s experience and
challenging patients and encouraging them to change is easily upset, with counterproductive
implications (see below). There are different emphases in each approach. DBT focuses more on skills
training to regulate emotion, increase resilience, adapt to and cope better with change, and reduce
destructiveness.51 TFP focuses on the patient-therapist transference, with the therapist’s interpretations
of the transference helping to reintegrate the patient’s mental, representational world and “narrative
coherence”, and to build the capacity for more secure attachment.52 In these ways, it approaches MBT
more closely than does DBT.53
MBT utilises individual and group psychotherapy to foster greater mentalising in attachment
relationships, both one-to-one and in group settings. At the individual level, like TFP, MBT utilises the
patient-therapist transference to enhance mentalisation and so stabilise the structure of the self,
initially via externalising the alien self “into” the therapist, but subsequently bringing the patient to
appreciate that they are in the therapist’s mind (that is, cared for and nurtured).54 Patients develop
capacities to understand that there can be different perspectives on the same situation, particularly in
group work and expressive activities. In the words of prominent therapists/researchers Bateman and
Fonagy, this approach:
aims to strengthen patients’ capacity to understand their own and others’ mental states in attachment
contexts in order to address their difficulties with affect, impulse regulation and interpersonal
functioning, which act as triggers for acts of suicide and self-harm.55
For all three approaches (and others), evidence is available of symptomatic improvement. It is too
early to claim that one is superior to the others, although Bateman and Fonagy’s eight-year follow-up
46 Johnson et al, n 39; Allen, n 27, pp 120-122.
47 Bateman and Fonagy, n 40, p 29; Gabbard, n 19, p 433; Allen, n 27, p 118.
48 PDM Taskforce, n 16, pp 825-826.
49 Recall that BKY was described as suffering from both bipolar disorder and BPD.
50 Allen, n 27, pp 145-150.
51 Allen, n 27, pp 145-147.
52 Allen, n 27, pp 148-149; Gabbard, n 19, pp 449-450.
53 These are clearly hyper-cryptic summaries of these treatment modalities. Interested readers should consult the references
provided in this column and others for more detailed descriptions.
54 Gabbard, n 19, p 449.
55 Bateman A and Fonagy P, “Randomized Controlled Trial of Outpatient Mentalization-based Treatment Versus Structured
Clinical Management for Borderline Personality Disorder” (2009) 166 Amer J Psychiatry 1355 at 1355.
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study of their MBT day hospital and out-patient program of the 1990s, the longest such study to date,
showed continuing stability five years after the end of treatment across a large number of diagnostic
and symptomatic criteria.56 Moreover, the apparent improvements in treatment outcomes from MBT
square with Bateman and Fonagy’s theoretical approach, considering the occurrence of poor progress
and indeed iatrogenic harm, as a result of some earlier attempts to build insight for patients from
prematurely challenging transference inferences. Because the very nature of BPD is one of weakness
of the patient’s subjectivity, and integrating one’s own and the therapist’s view on things requires the
capacity to mentalise, premature provision of what the therapist considers to be correct insight may
disrupt the attachment relationship that is being depended on for success, and this in turn further
inhibits the patient’s ability to mentalise. This calls for a more graded approach to sustain the fragile
balance between employing the attachment relationship to integrate the patient’s mental experience
with different viewpoints, and triggering a retreat or other defensive action on the part of the patient
by (seemingly to the patient) recreating the original abusive environment.57
In spite of this short account of improvements in treatment outcomes, prognosis in BPD, as with
the other personality disorders, is fraught. Generally speaking, most cases of personality disorder
cause some level of dysfunction throughout adult life, and chronicity tends to be associated with an
early onset;58 this is certainly characteristic of many cases of BPD. Poorer academic and occupational
achievement is more likely if BPD symptoms were already present in adolescence, as are adult
borderline symptoms, a diagnosis of BPD in adulthood and general impairment; these effects tend to
persist despite the decline of overt symptoms with age.59 Poorer outcomes are associated with greater
severity of borderline features,60 higher levels of borderline personality disorder criteria and functional
disability, and a history of childhood trauma.61
Some studies suggest that the prognosis for BPD is better than previously thought, with high
remission rates over a number of years, for example 88% remission over eight years in one study,62
and improvement in overall psychosocial functioning to a “good” level from 26% to 56% of
participants over six years in another study.63 However, there is an important prognostic theme across
a number of studies that is relevant to the issues examined in this article.
In Zanarini et al’s 2003 six-year follow-up of patients with BPD, while 73.5% of participants met
the DSM-based criteria for remission after six years, it was also observed that impulsive symptoms
resolved the most quickly, affective symptoms were the most chronic, and cognitive and interpersonal
symptoms were intermediate.64 In another study that compared patients with four different personality
disorders, including BPD, with patients with major depressive disorder, it was found that functional
impairments, especially social functioning, appeared to be an “enduring component” of personality
disorder, with no improvement in social functioning in patients with BPD.65 In a more recent study by
56 Bateman A and Fonagy P, “8-year Follow-up of Patients Treated for Borderline Personality Disorder: Mentalization-based
Treatment Versus Treatment as Usual” (2008) 165 Am J Psychiatry 631.
57 Bateman and Fonagy, n 40, pp 33-36.
58 Paris J, “Personality Disorders Over Time: Precursors, Course and Outcome” (2003) 17 J Pers Disord 479.
59 Winograd G, “Adolescent Borderline Symptoms in the Community: Prognosis for Functioning over 20 Years” (2008) 49 J
Child Psychol Psychiatry 933.
60 Ryle A, “Effectiveness of Time-limited Cognitive Analytic Therapy of Borderline Personality Disorder: Factors Associated
with Outcome” (2000) 73 Br J Med Psychol 197.
61 Gunderson JG et al, “Predictors of 2-year Outcome for Patients with Borderline Personality Disorder” (2006) 163 Am J
Psychiatry 822.
62 Zanarini MC et al, “Prediction of the 10-year Course of Borderline Personality Disorder” (2006) 163 Am J Psychiatry 827.
63 Zanarini MC et al, “Psychosocial Functioning of Borderline Patients and Axis II Comparison Subjects Followed
Prospectively for Six Years” (2005) 19 J Pers Disord 19.
64 Zanarini MC et al, “The Longitudinal Course of Borderline Psychopathology: 6-year Prospective Follow-up of the
Phenomenology of Borderline Personality Disorder” (2003) 160 Am J Psychiatry 274.
65 Skodol AE et al, “Stability of Functional Impairment in Patients with Schizotypal, Borderline, Avoidant, or Obsessive-
Compulsive Personality Disorder over Two Years” (2005) 35 Psychol Med 443.
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Zanarini and colleagues, it was observed that of the more persistent symptoms, some such as
impulsivity (such as acts of self-mutilation and attempted suicide), seemed to resolve more quickly,
while symptoms of chronic dysphoria such as anger and loneliness/emptiness, and interpersonal
symptoms, reflecting abandonment and dependency issues such as intolerance of aloneness, seemed to
be the most stable. The researchers concluded that BPD may consist of both symptoms that are
manifestations of acute illness and symptoms that represent more enduring aspects of the disorder.66
Bateman and Fonagy argue that while these recent studies have demonstrated that the majority of
patients experience substantial reduction in symptoms much sooner than previously thought, they note
that it is the symptoms of impulsivity that show the most dramatic change, with less improvement in
affective, interpersonal and social functioning. They consider that abandonment concerns, the sense of
emptiness and vulnerability to depression remain in roughly half of the treated patients.
DISCUSSION
The central question raised by the case of BKY is not whether discrimination occurred. It did occur in
the prevailing context of State anti-discrimination and health practitioner regulatory law, and the
tribunal was correct to make the distinction between the discrimination question and that of fitness to
practise in that context, and to decide in favour of BKY (but see below in relation to the legal context
in which BKY was argued). However, the split between the question of student discrimination and that
of fitness to practise is cause for concern. While universities have duties to their students, including
not discriminating against them, they arguably also have duties to help protect the safety of the
communities that support them. In addition, they have duties to prospective students where it is
considered, in good faith, that it is not in the interests of the students themselves to be involved in a
course that qualifies them to pursue certain kinds of work, but where it is highly probable that they
will encounter significant difficulty in discharging the duties that work entails. This concern is
reflected in those expressed to the tribunal about BKY by the Dean – her downward academic trend,
the quality of her current and continuing medical knowledge, her anxiety in relation to performance in
clinical rotations, and the risk of her practising unsafely – even though these did not constitute a
lawful basis for refusing to grant her an extension of her program as a student. This discussion uses
aspects of the case of BKY to argue towards an acceptance that this split requires careful
reconsideration.
Models of disease and illness
There may be something of an unstated, paradoxical relative bias in favour of students with mental
disorders, when it comes to questions of discrimination in relation to entry to medical and health care
programs. A person who is blind, or someone who lacks arms through some unfortunate congenital
genetic or exogenous cause, is likely to not consider undertaking such programs in the first place, or to
be dissuaded by friends or family, or to be sympathetically directed elsewhere upon application for
admission. The unspoken but agreed consensus is that a person with the limitations implied by these
physical conditions will be unable to undertake all the requirements of the program. But were such an
individual to insist on admission, and to claim that they were being discriminated against if admission
were rejected, it is difficult to see why they would not succeed in having the claim of discrimination
against them, as a student, recognised. In cases of mental disorder, the tendency for such cases to be
similarly “headed off at the pass” does not seem to occur. Anecdotal reports suggest that there is a
small but significant number of applicants to medical and health programs who are not rejected, but
who – like BKY – exhibit limitations and behaviours that are of great concern to educators, but who
are required to modify their programs to accommodate the particular implications of the disability. The
following is a recent example of the limitations of one student that required course adjustments from
an Australasian medical school:
66 Zanarini MC et al, “The Subsyndromal Phenomenology of Borderline Personality Disorder: A 10-year Follow-up Study”
(2007) 164 Am J Psychiatry 929.
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Disruptions to thought processing and storing information, together with impaired attention resulting in
difficulties organising and sustaining tasks, susceptibility to distraction and disrupted concentration, and
occasional absenteeism.67
Part of the reason for the apparent bias in favour of students with mental disorders in contrast to
those with physical disabilities may be the considerable progress made by supporters of the broadly
social model of disease and illness, in contrast to the traditional biomedical model. Steele describes
the social model of disability as comprehending a person’s impairment (the individually located
problem that the biomedical model would focus on) as a disability, to the extent that society disables
the person with the impairment by failing to provide adequate services and organising and modifying
itself to this end.68 At the extreme, the social model regards more or less all disability as being caused
by social factors or their absence, such that the armless man would be rendered completely able if
only sufficient social modifications and accommodations were made. Like other institutions,
universities have made various modifications to their physical environments to improve access for
students with physical disabilities. Similarly, accommodations and modifications are being made for
certain cognitive limitations, such as in the example above, in the same spirit of inclusion that is also
reflected in discrimination laws. Examples of these include allowing students to sit deferred
examinations, allowing more time to complete examinations, providing for peers to take notes,
allowing for extensions to program completion caps and so on.
This is consistent, inclusive and fair, and in the university environment, is generally workable in
practice as well as being supported in principle. It is also likely to be of little negative consequence to
the student or to others, once the student has graduated, in the case of non-professional programs. But
while the university environment is generally similar for commencing students in both professional
and non-professional programs, it is not the same once the professional students reach their clinical
placements, and certainly not the same when these students reach professional practice.69 This
suggests that the accommodations being required of medical and other health programs, at least for
some students with mental disorders and consequent disabilities, are inappropriate in the context of the
clinical environments that these students will enter as both students and junior health professionals.
The bias in favour of accommodating students with mental disabilities may also arise, in part as a
result of the historical tendency to regard “physical” disease as real or more real than psychological
conditions. Again, there is not room here to review the substantial literature on the history of the status
of psychiatry within medicine, the status and authority of psychiatric classifications and so on. Suffice
to say that, while great progress has been made to “normalise” psychiatry and its classifications within
medicine and health care, the very nature of this area of practice, involving as it does problems of
cognition, feeling, mood, will and behaviour with all their associations with values, responsibility and
morality, means that it is not perceived to be as hard and factual as problems like blindness or
armlessness are, and so may not be regarded as being as incompatible with practice as such
conditions.70 It is important to dispel this perception.
In a different direction from that taken by the social model of illness and disease away from the
traditional biomedical model, 25 ago Fulford provided an evaluative model of illness and disease in
order to demonstrate a number of important ideas. First, both psychological and organic conditions
67 Personal communication to author.
68 Steele L, “Making Sense of the Family Court’s Decisions on the Non-therapeutic Sterilisation of Girls with Intellectual
Disability” (2008) 22 Aust J Fam Law 1 at 7.
69 This claim is not extinguished by the “broad church” exception. Some opponents of any discrimination will see health care
and particularly medical practice as affording such a broad scope of vocational possibilities that everyone, no matter what their
apparent limitations, can be accommodated. For example, some who are more sanguine than others about admitting students
who are not compassionate and empathetic, argue that these students will likely find their way to vocations that involve minimal
or no direct patient contact, such as pathology. While this is overly simplistic, the stronger reason that the broad church
exception is faulty is that, at least as far as medicine is concerned, all graduates must complete the intern training year, which
does involve considerable patient contact, in order to then follow any particular career path.
70 This is likely to be more the case with non-health professionals, and also is likely to be as much an unconscious sort of
perception as a conscious one.
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involved two components, their descriptive content and an evaluative element. In organic conditions,
because of the strong consensus on negatively evaluating diseases, the evaluative element tends to
disappear from view, leaving what appears to be a set of medical scientific facts, and allowing
medicine to appear to operate without reference to values. This amounts to the biomedical model, with
disease as the primary organising concept.71 Fulford argued for a reverse view of the illness/disease
concepts, with illness as both logically and empirically prior to disease, given that we do not call
something a disease unless people first negatively evaluate its symptoms. This view better explains our
intuitions and the language we use in talking about disease and illness, than the biomedical model’s
view.72
Secondly, this account makes it easier to see both organic and psychological conditions as species
of the same broad category of illness, since both involve both descriptive and evaluative elements.
Fulford characterised both physical and psychological illnesses as “action failures” or failures of
“ordinary doing” in the absence of obstruction,73 in the respective areas of human life. Thirdly, this
conceptualisation allowed Fulford to attribute to mental disorders the same ontological and normative
status as physical conditions. Again, this accords with our intuitions concerning the seriousness of
many mental disorders, the degree of suffering they cause and the significant implications they hold
for people’s welfare and flourishing.
If Fulford’s account is correct, we should regard mental disorders as no less likely to be
incompatible with medical practice as physical conditions, subject to how compatible the particular
symptoms, experiences and capacities of the patient with the condition are with the requirements of
medical practice.
Medical practice, communication and emotional intelligence
Health care practice, and in particular medical practice, are demanding vocations, across physical,
mental and existential dimensions. Of course there are variations on these themes. Some orthopaedic
surgeons will need to be physically strong and resilient, as they are called on to work with heavy
limbs, significant muscular and gravitational forces, and other challenges to physical abilities. This
does not mean there are no female orthopaedic surgeons or that all orthopaedic surgeons are physical
brutes. But the tasks required and the capacities to discharge them cannot be ignored. All doctors, at
least initially and in most cases throughout their professional careers, communicate with patients,
usually on a one-to-one basis. Over recent years medical programs have increased their attention to
teaching and assessing communication skills in response to community and expert opinion that doctors
have generally not communicated well with their patients. This is historically bound to the shift from
the more paternalistic approach to the more patient-centred model of medical and health care. Most
communication skills teaching focuses on strategies to optimise history-taking, breaking bad news,
patient education and motivational interviewing, and other areas, and there is also an increasing
emphasis on trying to teach – or at least to encourage – compassion and empathy.74
Attention is paid somewhat less frequently and consistently in current medical programs to more
complex aspects of communication in providing health care, such as the role of emotions and
emotional intelligence, but this is now beginning to develop more explicitly,75 and will help fulfil the
aspirations of accreditation bodies in the area of effective and compassionate communication. For
example, the Australian Medical Council’s Standards for Assessment and Accreditation of Primary
Medical Programs includes these graduate attributes:
2.1 Demonstrate by listening, sharing and responding, the ability to communicate clearly, sensitively
and effectively with patients, their family/carers, doctors and other health professionals.
71 Fulford KWM, Moral Theory and Medical Practice (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989).
72 Parker M, “Overstating Values: Medical Facts, Diverse Values, Bioethics and Values-based Medicine” (2013) 27 Bioethics 97
at 98.
73 Fulford, n 71, pp 109-110, 120-121.
74 Batt-Rawden SA et al, “Teaching Empathy to Medical Students: An Updated, Systematic Review” (2013) 88 Acad Med 1171.
75 Gillam L et al, “The Role of Emotions in Health Professional Ethics Teaching” (2014) 40 J Med Ethics 331; Cherry MG et al,
“Emotional Intelligence in Medical Education: A Critical Review” (2014) 48 Med Educ 468.
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2.8 Elicit patients’ questions and their views, concerns and preferences, promote rapport, and ensure
patients’ full understanding of their problem(s). Involve patients in decision-making and planning their
treatment, including communicating risk and benefits of management options.
4.2 Demonstrate professional values including commitment to high quality clinical standards,
compassion, empathy and respect for all patients. Demonstrate the qualities of integrity, honesty,
leadership and partnership to patients, the profession and society.76
The General Medical Council, in its Outcomes and Standards for Undergraduate Medical
Education in the United Kingdom, states prescriptively that graduates will:
15(a) Communicate clearly, sensitively and effectively with patients, their relatives or other carers, and
colleagues from the medical and other professions, by listening, sharing and responding.
20(c) Be polite, considerate, trustworthy and honest, act with integrity, maintain confidentiality, respect
patients’ dignity and privacy, and understand the importance of appropriate consent.
20(e) Recognise the rights and the equal value of all people and how opportunities for some people may
be restricted by others’ perceptions.77
It is interesting and important to note that the emerging literature on emotions and emotional
intelligence in medical and health education, at this stage somewhat less than explicitly, expresses a
commitment to awareness of the crucial role in communication between health professionals and
patients of the psychodynamic processes involved in attributions of stigma, stereotyping, transference
and countertransference, as well as some of the mentalising and regulatory capacities noted as
disrupted or absent in BPD. (While these processes have always been important, they have been rather
confined to teaching in psychiatry, and even then have not always received close attention, depending
on the particular leanings of clinical teaching staff in relation to the more psychodynamically oriented
approaches to mental disorders.) For example, Cherry and colleagues in their recent review of
emotional intelligence in medical education, included in their literature search the “constructs of
compassion, sensitivity, empathy, emotional self-efficacy, emotional management, emotional regula-
tion and resistance to stress”.78 They noted that earlier authors have defined emotional intelligence in
terms of appraisal and expression of emotion in oneself and in others, regulation of emotion in oneself
and use of emotion to facilitate performance;79 and the means to perceive and express emotions and
regulate emotions in self and others.80 Cherry and colleagues argue that emotional intelligence
enhances all people’s ability to identify others’ emotional expressions and makes them “more satisfied
with their personal relationships, more flexible in social interactions, better able to manage their
moods and more adaptable when under stress”.81 These capacities, they further suggest, are even more
important for professionals who work in highly emotionally charged work environments and who
must respond appropriately to multiple emotional experiences on a daily basis.82
BKY, BPD and the tasks of medicine
Cherry and colleagues, and other commentators, wisely demur from extrapolating that emotional
intelligence should be considered in medical school selection processes and that it should be taught as
part of the medical curriculum. They base this hesitation on doubts about whether it is a personality
trait, a learned ability or some combination of the two and the lack of any evidence that “teaching”
76 Australian Medical Council, n 1.
77 General Medical Council, Tomorrow’s Doctors: Outcomes and Standards for Undergraduate Medical Education (2009),
http://www.gmc-uk.org/Tomorrow_s_Doctors_0414.pdf_48905759.pdf.
78 Cherry et al, n 75 at 470.
79 Davies M and Stankov L, “Emotional Intelligence: In Search of an Elusive Construct” (1998) 75 J Pers Soc Psychol 989;
Law K, Wong C and Song L, “The Construct and Criterion Validity of Emotional Intelligence and its Potential Utility for
Management Studies” (2004) 89 J Appl Psychol 483.
80 Kasman D, Fryer-Edwards K and Braddock C, “Educating for Professionalism: Trainees Emotional Experiences on IM and
Paediatrics Inpatient Wards” (2003) 78 Acad Med 730.
81 Cherry et al, n 75 at 471.
82 Cherry et al, n 75 at 471-472.
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emotional intelligence can develop professionalism,83 and also that viewing emotion as a set of
teachable skills and behaviours risks the devaluing of emotion in practice.84 Nevertheless, if as Ogle
and Bushnell point out, “[T]here is mounting evidence that aspects of intra- and inter-personal
functioning that could be considered components of EI, such as empathy, are positively related to
doctor competence and better patient outcomes”,85 and considering the conceptual links between
emotional intelligence and the expression and regulation of emotion, a question is raised as to whether
there may be a threshold of some kind below which some applicants with particular mental disorders
should be considered unsuitable for medical and other health care programs, just as we would consider
the blind or the armless applicant unsuitable.
Some care is required here in advocating empathy as an important requirement for health care
professionals. Two senses of empathy are illustrated by the following definition: “(t)he capacity to
enter into the experiencing world of the patient and all family members in order to understand what
they are going through … To know how to deal with somebody who is to be given bad news we have
to have some idea what they are experiencing.”86 Nobody can literally enter into the experiencing
world of someone else.87 That would raise questions about our self-identity, boundaries and object
relations. But our normal capacities for appreciating the perspectives of others do allow us to “have
some idea what they are experiencing”. This is an important distinction; expectations of health
practitioners’ capacities for empathy should be realistic and hence of the second sense noted here, but
even this realistic sense of the capacity for empathy is at significant risk as a result of the distortions
that occur in BPD.88
As argued above, Fulford’s analysis of psychological illness as structurally (descriptive and
evaluative components) equivalent to physical conditions is consistent with our knowledge of the
suffering they cause and their implications for welfare and flourishing. It is also consistent with the
New South Wales anti-discrimination legislation’s definition of disability as including the total or
partial loss of a person’s bodily or mental functions, functions being defined as “powers, authorities
and duties”,89 and as including a disability that a person has or is thought to have, or is thought to
have had in the past, or will have or is thought will have in the future.90 Thirdly, it is consistent with
the World Health Organization’s (WHO) classification of functioning, disability and health.91 The
WHO classification sensibly integrates the biomedical and social models, and consequently recognises
the reality of limitations of activity as “difficulties an individual may have in executing activities”,
which are in turn defined as tasks or actions.92 The WHO also includes “social norms” in the range of
norms, deviations from which may constitute impairment or disorder. This is important in the context
of some mental disorders and their sometimes prominent association, noted above, with values,
responsibility and moral relationships, and their effects on others.
83 Cherry et al, n 75 at 474.
84 McNaughton N and Zubairi M, “Emotional Intelligence: Convinced or Lulled?” (2014) 48 Med Educ 456.
85 Ogle JA and Bushnell JA, “The Appeal of Emotional Intelligence” (2014) 48 Med Educ 458.
86 Gillam et al, n 75 at 332.
87 Macnaughton J, “The Dangerous Practice of Empathy” (2009) 373 Lancet 1940.
88 The distinction, together with a belief in the “teachability” of emotion and empathy, have other implications for practice, also
related to appropriate boundaries. Encouraging students and practitioners into falsely believing that empathy is truly about
entering into the experiencing world of patients, arguably encourages sentimentality, or “the expression of emotions that one
does not truly feel”, with consequent risks to patients, students and practitoners. See O’Mahony S, “Against Narrative
Medicine” (2013) 56 Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 611 at 614-615.
89 Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW), s 4(1).
90 Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW), s 49(A)(a)-(d).
91 World Health Organization, International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF) (2001),
http://www.who.int/classifications/icf/en.
92 World Health Organization, Towards a Common Language for Functioning, Disability and Health: ICF (2002) p 10,
http://www.who.int/classifications/icf/icfbeginnersguide.pdf?ua=1.
Bioethical issues
(2014) 22 JLM 3146
Psychological disorders should therefore be squarely in the sights of those interested in the fitness
of applicants for medical and health education and practice. Moreover, those who subscribe to a more
social model of disability should be even more perturbed than others by the differences between the
preclinical student environment, in which various accommodations can appear to reduce dysfunction,
and the clinical student and postgraduate settings, where that model should, in consistency, insist on
the possibility that dysfunction will be exacerbated by the demanding physical, mental and existential
environmental factors that doctors and health practitioners experience daily. This is because these
features define the clinical environment, and they are not amenable to modification to accommodate
certain disabilities. It follows that there will be some applicants for medical and health care programs
who should not be selected, because their disabilities are incompatible with clinical practice.
There is a strong case to be made that the symptoms and signs that characterised BKY’s
disorders, as adduced by her psychiatrist in BKY, fall into this category. Let us recall that the
personality disorders are generally agreed to be ways of thinking, feeling, behaving and relating to
others that are usually stable over time. They involve processes that can produce significant problems
for the person and/or harm to others. These arise from failures to achieve capacities including stable
self-identity, self-appraisal and resilience, stable object relations, tolerance and regulation of affective
states, adequate reality testing, mature moral sensibility, appreciation of others’ perspectives,
expression of empathy and recognition of boundaries. More specifically, DSM-5 characterises BPD as
“a pervasive pattern of instability of interpersonal relationships, self-image, and affects, and marked
impulsivity that begins by early adulthood and is present in a variety of contexts”. We can assume that
BKY satisfied five or more of the diagnostic criteria that illustrate some of these developmental
problems and patterns, with these being underpinned by at least some of the defence mechanisms
described previously, including splitting, projective identification, introjection, and denial/control
of/depersonalisation/devaluation/idealisation of others.
Particularly in the context of BKY, the implications of accepting the general contours of the
mentalising model’s links between these processes and the intrapsychic and interpersonal
manifestations and the broad prognostic implications of the disorder, are clear. BKY exhibited
significant anxiety, especially performance anxiety on approaching examinations, and consequently
developed a pattern of avoidance with the need to complete the exams at later dates. She was
described as having a poor sense of self-worth and a fear of failure, and at times of having a paralysis
of her ability to study. She would take any way out of this anxiety, and this was described as an
avoidance of responsibility. More specifically, she suffered constant panic attacks in the third year of
enrolment, and could not attend problem-based learning tutorials due to anxiety.93 She experienced
exhaustion and continuing anxiety in the context of the demands of study,94 and applied for leave of
absence from the program in 2010.95 This was due to being overwhelmed by the need to commute
from Sydney, where she had decided to live, to Gosford, for the fourth (clinical) year of the
program.96 Subsequently she was unable to drive from Sydney to Newcastle to sit an exam due to a
panic attack.97
BKY’s psychiatrist suggested that she was capable of functioning under deadline pressure, but
this capacity was certainly not consistent, in view of the manifestations of her disorder as described.
The psychiatrist also stated that BKY was capable of completing the course, and predicted that her
symptoms were unlikely to emerge and disrupt effective functioning as a medical practitioner. While
the former may be true – albeit after approximately 10 years – the second prediction is surely
questionable in view of the facts of the case, the nature of BPD, and the role of emotional intelligence
in medical education and practice. Capacities for showing compassion, sensitivity and empathy, for
regulating one’s emotions appropriately (particularly in stressful situations which are common in
93 BKY v The University of Newcastle [2014] NSWCATAD 39 at [18].
94 BKY v The University of Newcastle [2014] NSWCATAD 39 at [20].
95 BKY v The University of Newcastle [2014] NSWCATAD 39 at [22].
96 BKY v The University of Newcastle [2014] NSWCATAD 39 at [25].
97 BKY v The University of Newcastle [2014] NSWCATAD 39 at [26].
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medical practice), and for being resilient and resistant to stress, are likely to be compromised in people
with BPD, because they are just the capacities that are conferred by the ability to mentalise. If the
therapist-BPD patient relationship itself involves risks associated with transference and
countertransference processes, then surely the relationship between a doctor with BPD and their
patient is subject to a risk of interference by exaggerated forms of these processes, as a result of the
residual fragility of the patient’s subjectivity and ability to mentalise. We should recall here that,
although the prognosis for BPD has improved in recent years with treatments focused on
psychodynamic processes, this appears to be selective. Most cases of personality disorder cause some
level of dysfunction throughout adult life; presence of BPD symptoms in adolescence predicts poorer
academic and occupational achievement; poorer prognosis in BPD is associated with more severe
diagnostic features; social functioning, chronic dysphoria and interpersonal symptoms are more
enduring components of the disorder, with some studies showing little or no improvement in these
factors in BPD; and abandonment concerns, the sense of emptiness and vulnerability to depression
remain in roughly half treated patients.
The extent to which these prognostic factors pertain to BKY is impossible to describe, but it
should be recalled that BKY was diagnosed with BPD, that she had been treated by a psychiatrist and
a psychologist for a long period of time,98 that she has – at least – significant limitations of her
resilience and resistance to stress, significant limitations of emotional tolerance and regulation,
significant incursions on her sense of self, and significant diminution of her ability to take
responsibility. From the point of view of BKY, these restrictions are arguably incompatible with the
demands of ordinary medical practice. From the point of view of patients, they signal potential threats
to safety.
Inherent requirements
By the time this column is published, Medical Deans Australia and New Zealand99 will have convened
a meeting of a working group of interested medical educators to continue a project initiated two years
ago to develop a definition and framework for inherent requirements for medical practice, in order to
establish national guidelines and establish a mechanism for medical schools in the two countries to
share definitions and case studies of dealing with students with disability and impairment.
The University of Western Sydney (UWS) has already developed a comprehensive Inherent
Requirements policy for its medical program,100 as one of a suite of “Inherent Requirements”
documents published by this university across a range of courses.101 Inherent Requirements are
generically defined by the UWS as:
(t)he essential components of a course or unit that demonstrate the capabilities, knowledge and skills to
achieve the core learning outcomes of the course or unit, while preserving the academic integrity of the
university’s learning, assessment and accreditation processes.102
The policy refers to the Commonwealth disability legislation that makes it unlawful for an educational
authority to discriminate against a person on the ground of the person’s disability, in relation to
admission, access to benefits or the development of curricula.103 It also refers to the Commonwealth
government’s Disability Standards for Education 2005, which requires institutions to take reasonable
steps that enable the student with a disability to participate in education on the same basis as a student
98 BKY v The University of Newcastle [2014] NSWCATAD 39 at [15]-[16].
99 Medical Deans Australia and New Zealand is the peak body representing professional-entry level medical education, training
and research in Australia and New Zealand: see http://www.medicaldeans.org.au.
100 University of Western Sydney, “Inherent Requirements for Medicine Courses”, http://www.uws.edu.au/ir/
inherent_requirements/inherent_requirements_for_medicine_courses.
101 For an example of how inherent requirements for individual programs have been developed at the University of Western
Sydney, see Bialocerkowski A et al, “Development of Physiotherapy Inherent Requirement Statements – An Australian
Experience” (2013) 13 BMC Med Educ 54, http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6920/13/54.
102 University of Western Sydney, “Inherent Requirements Key Terms”, http://www.uws.edu.au/ir/inherent_requirements/
inherent_requirements_key_terms.
103 Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth), s 22.
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without a disability, by making reasonable adjustments for the student.104 According to the Disability
Standards, an adjustment is reasonable in relation to a student with a disability if it balances the
interests of all parties affected.105 In determining whether an adjustment is reasonable, the Standards
require certain considerations to be taken into account, most of these being focused on the student, but
there is also a requirement to have regard to the effect of the proposed adjustment on anyone else
affected, including the education provider, staff and other students.106 The inclusion of the provider,
the staff and other students does not exhaust the scope of “anyone else affected”. In the context of
professional programs, this presumably includes those patients and health carers who may be affected
by the student’s actions during the course of clinical placements. Whether it extends to those patients
who would receive services provided by the person, once they have graduated and become a registered
practitioner, is less certain.
The UWS Inherent Requirements suite covers a number of generic domains: ethical behaviour,
behavioural stability, legal requirements, communication, cognition, sensory ability, strength and
mobility, and sustainable performance. For each domain a description and explanation of the
requirement is provided, together with the nature of any adjustment that may be made to allow
students to meet it.
The introduction to the Inherent Requirements for medicine courses states
Many of the activities associated with the professional practice of a medical practitioner are time
sensitive, where the capacity to perform certain activities within specified time limits is required to
reduce or avoid risks to patient safety and wellbeing. The safety and wellbeing of you and others is
always of paramount importance.107
The following selective and abridged Table is a synopsis of the particular UWS domain
categories, their justifications, conditions that should govern relevant adjustments, and exemplars, that
are relevant to the limitations demonstrated by BKY.
Synopsis of UWS domain categories
Domain Justification Adjustments Exemplars
Behavioural sta-
bility
Required to work individually
and in teams in changing and
unpredictable environments.
Medical students will be
exposed to emergency situa-
tions and human suffering and
will be required to have behav-
ioural stability to manage these
events objectively and profes-
sionally.
Must support stable, effective
and professional behaviour in
both academic and clinical set-
tings.
Coping with own emotions and
behaviour effectively when





patients is essential to diagnosis
and management.
Speed and interactivity of com-
munication may be critical for
patient safety or treatment.
Must address effectiveness,
timeliness, clarity and accuracy
issues to ensure patient safety.
Responding appropriately to a
care request in the clinical envi-
ronment.
104 Australian Government, Department of Education, Disability Standards for Education, http://education.gov.au/
disability-standards-education.
105 Australian Government, Department of Education, n 104, s 3.4(1).
106 Australian Government, Department of Education, n 104, s 3.4(2)(d).
107 University of Western Sydney, n 102.
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TABLE continued
Domain Justification Adjustments Exemplars
Communication
(non-verbal)
Ability to observe and under-
stand non-verbal cues/consis-
tent and appropriate facial
expressions, eye contact – pro-
mote trust in academic and pro-
fessional relationships.
Being sensitive to individual
differences displays respect and
empathy to others.
Must maintain capacity to rec-
ognise, respond to or initiate
effective non-verbal communi-
cation in a timely and appropri-
ate manner.
Recognising and responding




Sufficient physical and mental
endurance is an essential
requirement to perform mul-
tiple tasks in an assigned period
to provide safe and effective
care without compromise.
Must ensure that performance is
consistent and sustained over a
given period.
Participating in tutorials, lec-
tures, skills throughout the day.
Providing consistent care over a
negotiated time frame.
Note that the conditions applicable to the adjustments are explicitly or implicitly applicable, not
only to the academic environment but to the clinical environment and to patient safety. The sustainable
performance domain, and others such as sensory ability and strength and mobility, are clearly relevant
to the comparator cases – the blind and the armless applicants. It would be no more discriminatory to
prevent a person such as BKY from being admitted to a medical program than it would be to prevent
these applicants, on the grounds that in all three cases, no reasonable adjustment could be made in the
relevant domains. In relation to the requirement of the Disability Standards, that in determining
whether an adjustment is reasonable, regard be had to the effect of the proposed adjustment on anyone
else affected, there are good reasons to think that BKY would fail to satisfy all four adjustment types
indicated in relation to clinical placements as a student, and clinical practice following graduation.
However, BKY was argued in terms of the relevant State legislation, with no reference made to the
Commonwealth legislation and its subsidiary Disability Standards for Education 2005. This reflects
the fact that aggrieved students have the choice to argue their discrimination case under either
jurisdiction, and may prefer not to risk an adverse costs order in the event of losing the case in the
Federal Court.108 Nevertheless, this does not mean that the Standards are not relevant to matters
argued under State legislation, in the sense of providing benchmarks that education providers should
aim to uphold. It is somewhat surprising that the Standards were not adverted to by the university, in
relation to the Dean’s concern about BKY’s declining health status in relation to continuing the
program. As noted above, in determining whether an adjustment is reasonable, the Standards require
considerations to be made in relation to the student, and one of these would be health and welfare.
This column does not attempt to canvas the range of Inherent Requirements that exist in
jurisdictions comparable with Australasia. However, it will be helpful to briefly describe the situation
in the United Kingdom. Although the primary concern of the Medical Board of Australia in relation to
students is impairment,109 and there are mandatory reporting conditions imposed on medical and other
108 Personal communication by E Dickson to author.
109 BKY self-reported her condition to the then New South Wales Medical Board in 2008 (BKY v The University of Newcastle
[2014] NSWCATAD 39 at [21]). The State boards were replaced by the Medical Board of Australia in 2010, with “branch”
boards in each State. New South Wales legislated for the Medical Council of New South Wales, “whose main role is to ensure
doctors are fit to practise medicine” (see Medical Council of New South Wales, “FAQ: What is the Difference Between the
NSW Medical Council and the HCCC?”, http://www.mcnsw.org.au/page/305/about-us/frequently-asked-questions/faqs-general/
faq--what-is-the-difference-between-the-nsw-medical-council-and-the-health-care-complaints-commissio). However, in New
South Wales, the Health Care Complaints Commission is the body that makes final decisions on investigation outcomes, and
that prosecutes serious cases before disciplinary bodies.
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health care education providers in relation to impaired students who satisfy certain conditions,110 it has
a less “hands-on” approach than the General Medical Council. The Council has a broader and more
active involvement in student conduct, performance and impairment, and the behaviour of medical
schools, than the Medical Board of Australia. It provides guidance to the schools on students’
professional values and fitness to practise, which is described as advisory rather than mandatory,
although this is qualified by the following statement:
However, GMC quality assurance reports on medical schools may recommend that they comply with
the guidance or may commend an institution for good practice. Also, given that the GMC has to be
satisfied that graduates applying for registration with a licence to practise are fit to practise, it would be
surprising if a medical school thought it sensible to disregard this guidance.111
The guidance strongly emphasises the relationships between health, disability and fitness to
practise. While giving strong support to the principles that “medical education and training should be
able to accommodate people with a range of ambitions, different faiths and backgrounds, as well as
those with health conditions and disabilities”,112 and that “in most cases, health conditions and
disabilities will not raise fitness to practise concerns, provided the student receives the appropriate
care and reasonable adjustments necessary to study and work safely in a clinical environment”,113 the
guidance also indicates that medical students must be fit to practise medicine, and that “in exercising
the responsibility to register only doctors who are fit to practise, the Council will always put the safety
of patients above all other considerations”.114 Furthermore, a student’s fitness to practise is called into
question:
(w)hen their behaviour or health raises a serious or persistent cause for concern about their ability to
continue on a medical course, or to practise as a doctor after graduation. This includes, but is not
limited to, the possibility that they could put patients or the public at risk, and the need to maintain trust
in the profession.115
Under these circumstances, the medical school must consider invoking its fitness to practise
procedures, and this is distinct from any general disciplinary procedures that the university may
have.116 While invoking the procedures will be infrequent, the guidance provides for: (1) a much
greater involvement of the medical profession in the management of students who pose risks to public
safety, either currently or potentially; and (2) a significantly greater responsibility on the part of
universities to contribute to ensuring public safety in relation to the education and future practice of
their students.
This position is supported by the statement Medical Students – Standards of Medical Fitness to
Train,117 produced by Higher Education Occupational Physicians/Practitioners (HEOPS), the
professional association for all occupational health professionals working in the United Kingdom
higher education sector,118 and which develops sector-specific policies and guidance on the control
and management of health risks in the sector, to assist national bodies such as the General Medical
110 Under the National Law, as implemented in each State and Territory, students are defined as impaired if they have a physical
or mental impairment, disability, condition or disorder (including substance abuse or dependence) that detrimentally affects or is
likely to detrimentally affect their capacity to undertake clinical training (Health Practitioner Regulation National Law Act 2009
(Qld), s 5). An impaired student who, in the course of undertaking clinical training, may place the public at substantial risk of
harm, must be reported to the Medical Board of Australia by the education provider (Health Practitioner Regulation National
Law Act 2009 (Qld), s 141(1)(b)).
111 General Medical Council, Medical Students: Professional Values and Fitness to Practise (2009) at [7],
http://www.gmc-uk.org/education/undergraduate/professional_behaviour.asp#12scopeof.
112 General Medical Council, n 111 at [46].
113 General Medical Council, n 111 at [50].
114 General Medical Council, n 111 at [47].
115 General Medical Council, n 111 at [70] (emphasis added).
116 General Medical Council, n 111 at [71].
117 Higher Education Occupational Physicians/Practitioners, Medical Students – Standards of Medical Fitness to Train (2013),
http://www.heops.org.uk/HEOPS_Medical_Students_fitness_standards_2013_v10.pdf.
118 Higher Education Occupational Physicians/Practitioners, http://www.heops.org.uk/index.php.
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Council to develop policies and guidance on fitness to practise and protecting and promoting the
health of staff and students. The HEOPS statement includes categories of functional capacity that
should be assessed to ensure safe practice that are somewhat similar to the UWS list. These are
mobility, upper limb function, vision, hearing, speech, literacy, numeracy, skin function/integrity,
interruption of consciousness, and concentration, awareness, memory and ability to learn and
understand.
Our blind and armless applicants would simply fail to meet the thresholds indicated for the
relevant HEOPS criteria. While guidelines do not have the power to automatically prevent admission
of such applicants to medical and other health courses, this is not a problem, given the clear
incompatibility with medical practice of these disabilities. However, the category of concentration,
awareness, memory and ability to learn and understand, which is the most relevant to students such as
BKY, is more purely “cognitive” than comprehensively psychological. Moreover, no discrete
thresholds of fitness to practise are proposed for this category as occur in the purely physical
categories of upper limb function and vision. This may reflect the fact that occupational physicians are
usually physicians and not psychiatrists, and the persistence of the ontological disparity between
physical and mental disorders as challenged by Fulford.
CONCLUSIONS
This column has challenged this disparity, and argued that there will be cases where mental disabilities
will be sufficiently serious and chronic to justify preventing the admission of a very small number of
students to medical and other health care education programs. The emphasis on support of disabled
students, vital though it is, needs a measure of rebalancing. There appears to be some dissonance
between federal and State law, at least as illustrated by the clear basis in New South Wales law for the
decision to uphold the appeal of BKY against the University of Newcastle’s refusal to extend her
period of study, and the provisions in the Commonwealth Disability Standards for Education 2005,
which qualify the requirement that institutions make reasonable adjustments for disabled students with
the need to have regard to the effect of the proposed adjustment on the student, but also “anyone else
affected”. The need to have this second kind of regard is recognised by the General Medical Council’s
guidance to medical schools, which includes the requirement for implementing fitness to practise
procedures when student behaviour or health is a cause for concern about the ability of the student, not
just to continue the medical course, but also to practise as a doctor without putting patients at risk.
The alternatives currently available for most Australasian medical schools are less than
satisfactory. In the more acute cases, educators often simply hope that time to complete the program
will lapse for students about whom they are seriously concerned, both from the student’s own welfare
point of view, and from that of public safety. Another “solution” is that the student’s difficulties will
result in the sufficient progressive accrual of academic failures for exclusion on academic grounds.
Given the strong support that universities provide for students, including various appeal processes, this
is (anecdotally, though strongly so) frequently a long and difficult, and often disappointing road.
Another possible response available to universities is to reduce the time for completion. This is
unlikely to occur as long as the universities maintain an exclusive focus on health professional
students as students, rather than as students and future health professionals. Finally, the compulsory
registration of medical and other health practitioner students with the relevant boards, under the
National Registration and Accreditation Scheme,119 may go some way to ameliorating the concerns of
educators, in view of the boards’ statutory responsibility to protect the public. However, this would
presumably require a change in the way the boards consider and manage the kinds of implications of
certain mental disorders that have been canvassed in this column.120
119 Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency, “Student Registration”, http://www.ahpra.gov.au/Registration/
Student-Registrations.aspx.
120 Under the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth), s 19, it is also “unlawful for an authority or body that is empowered to
confer, renew, extend, revoke or withdraw an authorisation or qualification that is needed for or facilitates the practice of a
profession, the carrying on of a trade or the engaging in of an occupation to discriminate against a person on the ground of the
person’s disability”. However, the Act also allows for discrimination where, “because of the disability, the aggrieved person
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It remains to be seen what the Medical Deans Australia and New Zealand project will be able to
achieve. A national definition, framework and guidelines for inherent requirements for medical
practice will be a sound start, and the UWS policy is an excellent template. But the achievement of
effective action will also require fundamental changes in the conception of their broader
responsibilities on the part of the universities, further clarification of the application of State and
commonwealth anti-discrimination law, and possible law reform.
Malcolm Parker
Professor of Medical Ethics, University of Queensland
Thanks to Elizabeth Dickson for discussion and advice concerning the intersection of State and
Commonwealth anti-discrimination law, in the context of tertiary education and inherent
requirements.
would be unable to carry out the inherent requirements of the particular work, even if the relevant employer, principal or
partnership made reasonable adjustments for the aggrieved person” (s 21(a)(1)). While these provisions may seem like a safety
switch that can be flicked when the student finally reaches the practice environment but proves to be a threat to public safety,
educators lament the fact that the strict separation of powers between the university and the practice sectors results in
considerable investments of time, energy and emotion on the part of students, educators, other staff, supporters and regulators,
that ultimately prove fruitless in the kinds of cases canvassed here.
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